

CĂTĂLIN ENACHE

## The intelligence typology in Hippocrates' De victu I 35

*Summary* – Book I of the Hippocratic treatise De victu deals with the philosophical foundations of medicine and concludes with a typology of human intelligence according to the soul's composition of fire and water. In this paper I examine ch. I 32 within the philosophical and anthropological context of De victu I, with special emphasis on the relations between the intelligence typology and the typology of human constitutions described by the author in ch. I 32.

Book I of the Hippocratic treatise De victu describes the philosophical foundations of medicine. As the author writes in ch. I 2, one has to study and comprehend first of all the nature of man in order to give an appropriate account of the human regimen.<sup>1</sup> The author states that one has to know what a man is made of and the reasons of his general health to understand the meaning of dietetical prescriptions and apply them in a specific situation. Since health is regarded in De victu, as in other Hippocratic treatises,<sup>2</sup> as a balance of body constituents, and illness as a disequilibrium thereof, medical (i. e. dietetical) proficiency amounts to the theoretical knowledge of the factors which affect the relation of body constituents. The physician, being an expert of the (human) φύσις, so to speak, knows how to cure a disease, because he knows what is generally wrong and how the balance can be restored in a sick body.<sup>3</sup>

The philosophical considerations in Book I suggest a metaphysical explanation of nature and human body through two elements, fire and water,

---

<sup>1</sup> δεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς συγγράφειν περὶ διαίτης ἀνθρωπίνης πρῶτον μὲν παντὸς φύσιν ἀνθρώπου γινῶναι καὶ διαγινῶναι “anyone who wants to write about human regimen has to know and understand in the first place the nature of man” (ch. I 2, CMG 122, 22/23). Throughout this paper I will cite the Greek text of R. Joly (CMG). All translations are my own.

<sup>2</sup> See for instance De veteri medicina 14, De natura hominis 4. The first who held this opinion was, according to tradition, Alcmaeon of Croton (1<sup>st</sup> half of the 5<sup>th</sup> century BC).

<sup>3</sup> See e. g. ch. III 69: ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ κρατεῖσθαι ὀποτερονούν νοῦσοι ἐγγίνονται· ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἰσάζειν πρὸς ἄλληλα ὑγιείη πρόσεστιν “Illness arises when one of these aspects [sc. food and physical effort] prevails over the other; health means that they are balanced” (CMG 200, 32–202, 2).

concluding with an elaborate typology of humans according to their intelligence (ch. I 35). The author claims that a person's level of intelligence depends on the proportion of fire and water in his soul. Consequently, a dietetical improvement of a person's innate abilities should be possible within certain limits, provided that proper measures are applied. He presents eight categories of more or less intelligent people and provides most of them with prescriptions aiming to equilibrate the soul's balance of fire and water. The last chapter of Book I, ch. I 36, which is more or less an appendix to ch. I 35, mentions some temperamental features that do not depend on the soul's mixture of fire and water, concluding the philosophical introduction to medicine. Afterwards, Book II contains a detailed exposé of the dietetic factors affecting man's health.

In this paper<sup>4</sup> I will examine ch. I 35 within the philosophical and anthropological context of *De victu I*, with special emphasis on the comparison between the intelligence typology described therein and the typology of human constitutions described by the author in ch. I 32. In the present discussion I will often refer to my previously published analysis of ch. I 32.<sup>5</sup>

As an introduction, I will start with a summary of that analysis. The author of *De victu* claims that everything in the world, including animals and humans, is made of fire and water. The two elements combine in different proportions and, by means of collaboration, create the infinity of real things. Their successful combination is possible due to their fundamental properties, fire being warm and dry, and water being cold and wet (ch. I 3). As already depicted,<sup>6</sup> if temperature and humidity are the two axes of a Cartesian coordinate system, the dual ontology of *De victu* might be represented by the following scheme:




Figure 1

<sup>4</sup> I am indebted to Laura Andreias (Cleveland) and Monika Poschner (Vienna) for decisive support in revising this paper.

<sup>5</sup> C. Enache, The typology of human constitutions in Hippocrates' *De victu I*, 32, *Wiener Studien* 124 [2011], 39–54.

<sup>6</sup> C. Enache, *The typology* 40–43.

The upper half of the scheme represents the realm of fire, while the lower half belongs to water. In addition, both fire and water can have typical and atypical manifestations: although fire itself is warm and dry, there can also be a warm and wet variety of fire; at the same time, water itself is cold and wet, but there can also be a cold and dry variety of water (ch. I 4). This scheme is essential for understanding the use of the different varieties of the elements in Book I, and to support this interpretation in the cited paper I have tried to explain the arguments in its favour, especially those independent of ch. I 32.

Moreover, if we consider the eight varieties of fire and water mentioned in ch. I 32 as components of the human constitutions, the above scheme will look as follows:<sup>7</sup>




Figure 2

As can be seen, according to ch. I 32 there are three typical varieties and one atypical variety both of fire and water. The analysis of the system of human constitutions shows a certain peculiarity of the atypical varieties of the elements. Firstly, wet fire and dry water are the only quarters of the scheme which do not combine in producing a constitution. Secondly, wet fire and dry water are the only components which always decide the nature of the constitution they partake of: constitution 4, made of wet fire and dense water, corresponds to spring, i. e. is warm and wet (just like wet fire); and constitution 6, made of rare fire and dry water, corresponds to autumn, i. e. is cold and dry (just like dry water). Thirdly, wet fire and dry water do not combine symmetrically with typical varieties of the elements.

These were the conclusions provided by the analysis of ch. I 32, which will set the foundation for the study of the typology of human intelligence in ch. I 35.

<sup>7</sup> C. Enache, The typology 52, Figure 5 with comments.

In ch. I 35 the author of *De victu* describes eight categories of persons, from the most intelligent to the most stupid. The first two categories represent the highest and the lowest intelligence level, while the following six categories are divided into two groups; these groups both contain three categories and have a symmetrical stratified structure. The intelligence categories are differentiated qualitatively and quantitatively by the combination of fire and water in a person. If we consider the description of the last six intelligence categories, divided by the author in two symmetrical groups dominated in different degrees by each of the elements respectively, we may infer that the three categories of these two groups correspond to each other in terms of intelligence level, despite the peculiarities characteristic of the predominance of water or fire in each group.<sup>8</sup> I therefore consider the typology as consisting of five intelligence levels altogether and summarize it in the following manner:

intelligence level	composition	
very intelligent	(1) wet fire + dry water (balanced)	
intelligent	(3) pure fire + water fire is dominated by water	(6) water + pure fire water is dominated by fire
less intelligent	(4) fire + water fire is even more dominated by water	(7) water + fire water is even more dominated by fire
stupid	(5) fire + water fire is fully dominated by water	(8) water + fire water is fully dominated by fire
very stupid	(2) wet fire + dry water (unbalanced)	

Figure 3

<sup>8</sup> The characterization of the respective level of intelligence is significant: persons of the third category are intelligent and perseverant (φρόνιμοι, παραμόνιμοι), the soul of the sixth category is intelligent (φρόνιμος ή ψυχή), and the soul of the seventh category is less perseverant (ήσσον μόνιμος ή ψυχή). Both the fifth and the eighth categories are close to madness (μανία), the fifth category contains stupid people (ἄφρονες), which points out its opposition to the first category.

The *opinio communis* of the Hippocratic commentators<sup>9</sup> regards the second category not as an autonomous intelligence category, but as a degeneration of the first category and, consequently, includes only seven items in this typology. Therefore, I will briefly detail my reasoning. The Hippocratic description of an intelligence category includes (1) a specification of the mixture of fire and water characteristic of the people in the respective category, (2) a characterization of the intelligence level, (3) a psycho-physiological account of the intelligence level, and (4) dietetical recommendations regarding the improvement of intelligence. Doubtless, the first three of these features apply to the second category: we know it is an unbalanced mixture of wet fire and dry water, we know that persons in this category are “very stupid” (ἄφρονέστατοι) and we also know the reason why this composition is very stupid (the stronger element is self-sufficient). It is true that the fourth feature is missing, because the author doesn't give any hints as to the improvement of intelligence, but this in my view should not be a decisive criterion, since in the description of the first category he doesn't include them either. Besides, the dietetical prescriptions given in this chapter do not really contain anything new compared to Books II and III. Admittedly, one can speculate why the first two categories contain no dietetical recommendations, e. g. the first category doesn't need them, while the second is hopeless,<sup>10</sup> yet this would be nothing but mere speculation. The fact is that the second category is not the only one lacking the fourth feature.

Apart from these features I only see two possible objections against my interpretation of the second category as an autonomous intelligence category. Firstly, the words εἰ δὲ, which are used by the author to introduce most of the categories. I regard this criterion as irrelevant, since the first category again wouldn't qualify.<sup>11</sup> Secondly, in the description of the third

<sup>9</sup> C. Fredrich, *Hippokratische Untersuchungen*, Berlin 1899, 106; R. Joly, *Recherches sur le traité pseudo-hippocratique Du régime*, Paris 1960, 179; F. Hüffmeier, *Phronesis in den Schriften des Corpus Hippocraticum*, *Hermes* 89 (1961), 78; J. Jouanna, *La théorie de la sensation, de la pensée et de l'âme dans le traité hippocratique du Régime: ses rapports avec Empédocle et le Timée de Platon*, *Aion* 29 (2007), 14; H. Bartoš, *Soul, seed and palingenesis in the Hippocratic de Victu*, *Apeiron* 49 (2009), 24.

<sup>10</sup> In reality, the author's conception of dietetics requires that regimen influences *all* soul mixtures, i. e. that it must be able to deteriorate the first category and to improve the second. This follows from ch. I 36, where intelligence as such is opposed to other temperamental features, like irascibility or relaxedness, that cannot be dietetically influenced. See also R. Joly, *CMG* 258, comm. ad l.

<sup>11</sup> As a matter of fact, these similarities between the first two categories can be considered another argument in favour of my interpretation.

category, the author compares its intelligence level to that of the first category by the words

φρόνιμοι μὲν καὶ οὗτοι, ἐνδεέστεροι δὲ τῆς προτέρης

“these too are intelligent, but inferior to (the people of) the afore mentioned (mixture)” (ch. I 35, CMG 152,9/10),

which might give the impression that he doesn't take into consideration the second category. In reality, the term ἡ προτέρα can only refer to the anterior mixture of fire and water (σύγκρησις), because this is the only feminine noun he used with respect to the first category. But since the first two categories are both made of wet fire and dry water, the term ἡ προτέρα obviously includes both of them, although the author means only the intelligent instance of this mixture.

As can be seen in Figure 3, the author describes the dual composition of the seven intelligence types using a total of five different components: πῦρ ὑγρόν (wet fire),<sup>12</sup> ὕδωρ ξηρόν (dry water), πῦρ εἰλικρινές (pure fire), πῦρ (fire) and ὕδωρ (water). However, considering (1) the climactic character of each of the two groups, in which either fire is gradually dominated by water (categories 3–4–5) or water is gradually dominated by fire (categories 6–7–8); as well as (2) the analogous structure of these two groups, I infer that there is no difference between the concepts “fire” (πῦρ) and “pure fire” (πῦρ εἰλικρινές). In other words, if the (quantitative) climax of the intelligence categories 3–4–5 and 6–7–8 has to make sense, one should take for granted a qualitatively similar composition of the soul in each of the two groups (3–4–5 and 6–7–8, respectively).<sup>13</sup> If this is the case and πῦρ εἰλικρινές only means πῦρ – just like ὕδωρ has no other determination in the categories 3 to 8 –, then it may be said that the author of *De victu* only uses

<sup>12</sup> The author prefers, just like in ch. I 32, the superlative form of the adjectives ὑγρόν and ξηρόν. For the sake of convenience, I only use their positive form in this paper.

<sup>13</sup> For instance, the intelligence categories in which fire is dominated by water are introduced by the following words: εἰ δὲ πυρὸς τοῦ εἰλικρινεστάτου καὶ ὕδατος σύγκρησιν λάβοι, ἐνδεέστερον δὲ τὸ πῦρ εἶη τοῦ ὕδατος ὀλίγον ... “if the composition is made of purest fire and water, and fire is a little inferior to water” (third category, CMG 152, 8/9; note the absence of the fire's determination in the second half of the sentence!), εἰ δὲ τι ἐνδεεστέραν τὴν δύναμιν τὸ πῦρ λάβοι τοῦ ὕδατος ... “if the power of fire is quite inferior to water” (fourth category, CMG 152, 28/29), εἰ δὲ κρατηθεῖ ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ πῦρ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐόντος ὕδατος ... “if fire is even more dominated by the existing water” (fifth category, CMG 154, 7/8). The author's intention is undoubtedly to emphasize the unity of this threefold structure. A similar diction can be found in the categories in which water is dominated by fire.

four components of the soul in his typology of human intelligence, viz. wet fire, dry water, fire and water. My reading of ch. I 35 is that these four components are precisely the varieties of the elements illustrated by the four quarters of Figure 1 and Figure 2 above.

The main merit of this assumption is that it allows a contextual examination of the intelligence typology, taking into account the metaphysical background of Book I. Indeed, if the typology of human intelligence and the typology of human constitutions both deal with a man's being made of (varieties of) fire and water, it is only reasonable to think that the author used similar components in both descriptions. That makes a comparison of ch. I 35 with ch. I 32 (and, indirectly, with ch. I 3/4) not only possible, but desirable as well.

The human constitutions are differentiated in ch. I 32 according to the body's composition of fire and water.<sup>14</sup> This criterion is not so clear in ch. I 35, although the author announces the topic of the chapter from the very beginning:

περὶ δὲ φρονήσιος ψυχῆς ὀνομαζομένης καὶ ἀφροσύνης ὧδε ἔχει.

"This is the truth about the so-called intelligence and stupidity of the soul." (ch. I 35, CMG 150,29)

Thus, intelligence is presented as a property of the soul, therefore one would expect the rest of the chapter to give more details about the soul's composition of fire and water. However, in the following sentence, when introducing the first intelligence category, the author clearly states that he will actually be dealing with body's composition:

πυρὸς τὸ ὑγρότατον καὶ ὕδατος τὸ ξηρότατον κρῆσιν λαβόντα ἐν τῷ σώματι φρονημώτατον.

"If the wettest fire and the driest water mix together in a body, [the person<sup>15</sup> is] very intelligent." (ch. I 35, CMG 150,29/30)

To make it even more confusing, a few sentences further down he adds:

ἐκ τούτων δ' ἡ ψυχὴ συγκρηθεῖσα φρονημωτάτη καὶ μνημονικοτάτη.

<sup>14</sup> See, for instance, the introduction to constitution 1: ὕδατος δὲ τὸ λεπτότατον καὶ πυρὸς τὸ ἀραιότατον σύγκρησιν λαβόντα ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ σώματι "if the rarest water and the finest fire combine in a human body ..." (ch. I 32, CMG 148,3/4).

<sup>15</sup> Or, maybe, "the soul"; both are mentioned alternatively in the description of other categories.

“The soul composed of these [elements] is very intelligent and has the best memory.” (ch. I 35, CMG 152, 5/6)

This ambiguity is present throughout ch. I 35,<sup>16</sup> because in the rest of the chapter there is no specification at all as to whether the mixture of fire and water which defines an intelligence category concerns the body, the soul, or anything else.<sup>17</sup> It appears that for the author it made no difference if he referred to the soul’s composition or the body’s composition, so the most plausible hypothesis would be to suppose that he regarded body and soul as (always?) having the same mixture of fire and water. An argument in favour of this hypothesis is that the dietetic prescriptions given in ch. I 35 apply to the body (what else?), but aim in fact at the soul. For instance, if a person in the fourth intelligence category wants to improve his innate abilities, he has to follow a regimen based on fire. This regimen, which includes different measures concerning the body, like dry food, intense effort<sup>18</sup> or hot baths, involves not only the improvement of overall health, but also of intelligence.<sup>19</sup> If the same regimen achieves to restore the balance of fire and water in the body and soul respectively, then the reason is probably that they both have a similar composition. Somewhere else, the author expresses the correlation between health (of the body) and intelligence (of the soul) in conditional form: a soul of the sixth category is intelligent if the body is healthy and not disturbed by other weaknesses.<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, in another

<sup>16</sup> This has already been pointed out by B. Gundert, *Soma and Psyche in Hippocratic Medicine*, in: *Psyche and Soma. Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment*, ed. by J. P. Wright and P. Potter (Oxford 2000), 22 n. 55.

<sup>17</sup> See also the concluding words at the beginning of the next chapter: *περὶ μὲν οὖν φρονίμου καὶ ἄφρονος ψυχῆς ἢ σύγκρησις αὐτῆ αἰτία ἐστίν* “this is the combination responsible for the intelligent and stupid soul” (ch. I 36, CMG 156, 19).

<sup>18</sup> I see no better translation for the Greek *πόνος*, which in *De victu* (see ch. II 61) comprises not only physical exercises (“intense effort”), but also sensorial and intellectual activity (“natural effort”). The equation *πόννοι* = exercises, very common in secondary literature and adopted by W. H. S. Jones even in his translation of ch. II 61 (Hippocrates. Volume IV, Cambridge 1931, 349; see, however, his note ad l.), is in my opinion misleading.

<sup>19</sup> *ταῦτα ποιέων ὑγιεινότερος ἂν καὶ φρονιμώτερος εἴη* “if he does all this, he will be healthier and more intelligent” (ch. I 35, CMG 154, 6/7).

<sup>20</sup> *ἐν ὑγιαίνουσι σώμασι φρόνιμος ἢ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ* “such a soul is intelligent in healthy bodies” (ch. I 35, CMG 154, 14); *ἦν γὰρ ὑγιηρῶς ἔχη τὸ σῶμα καὶ μὴ ὑπ’ ἄλλου τινὸς συνταράσσεται, τῆς ψυχῆς φρόνιμος ἢ σύγκρησις* “if the body is healthy and not disturbed by something else, the soul’s mixture is intelligent” (ch. I 35, CMG 154, 20/21). Here, the author refers again to the soul’s composition (*σύγκρησις τῆς ψυχῆς*).



category description he gives precise physiological details about the impact of physical effort and food on the soul.<sup>21</sup>

A parallel between the four components of the intelligence typology and the four quarters of Figure 1 and Figure 2 is, of course, facilitated by the atypical varieties wet fire and dry water.<sup>22</sup> The parallel clarifies the meaning of the concept “pure fire” (πῦρ εἰλικρινές) as well as its simplified denomination as “fire” (see above): pure fire is genuine fire, i. e. fire itself, i. e. warm and dry fire, in contrast to “impure fire”, i. e. to that fire that, according to ch. I 4, being wet, has something from water. Also, it is to be supposed that the water by which the author defines the intelligence categories 3 to 8 is in fact “pure water” (ὑδὼρ εἰλικρινές), although he didn't call it this way.<sup>23</sup>

But if pure fire comprises all typical varieties of fire, and water (as it is called in ch. I 35) all typical varieties of water, illustrated in Figure 2, then it also becomes manifest why the author of De victu preferred to omit in ch. I 35 all the denominations of typical varieties mentioned in ch. I 32. It is because most of the constitutions in ch. I 32 are actually composed of typical

<sup>21</sup> πάλησι δὲ καὶ τρίψεσι καὶ τοῖσι τοιοῦτοις γυμνασίοισιν οὐ συμφέροι χρήσθαι, ὅπως μὴ κοιλότερων τῶν πόρων γινομένων πλησμονῆς πληρῶνται, βαρύνεσθαι γὰρ ἀνάγκη τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν κίνησιν ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων. τοῖσι περιπάτοις συμφέροι χρήσθαι καὶ ἀπὸ δείπνου καὶ ὀρθρίοισι καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν δρόμων, ἀπὸ δείπνου μὲν, ὅπως τροφὴν ξηροτέραν ἢ ψυχῆ δέχεται ἀπὸ τῶν ἐσιόντων, ὀρθρου δέ, ὅπως αἱ διέξοδοι κενῶνται τοῦ ὑγροῦ καὶ μὴ φράσσωνται οἱ πόροι τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν γυμνασίων, ὅπως μὴ ἐγκαταλείπεται ἐν τῷ σώματι τὸ ἀποκριθὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ δρόμου μηδὲ συμμίσγηται τῇ ψυχῇ μηδὲ ἐμφράσση τὰς διεξόδους μηδὲ συνταράσση τὴν τροφὴν “Wrestling, massage or similar physical exercises are not useful, lest the passages fill up with surfeit when growing hollower, and this necessarily slows down the motion of the soul. Walks are always useful – after dinner, in the morning and after running. After dinner, so that the soul may receive drier nourishment from what is eaten; in the morning, so that the channels may eliminate the wet and the passages of the soul may not get obstructed; after exercises, so that the secretion from running may not remain in the body and mix with the soul and obstruct the channels and disturb the nourishment” (ch. I 35, CMG 152, 16–24). See also CMG 204, 1–3.

<sup>22</sup> I have already pointed out the peculiarity of wet fire and dry water within the system of eight varieties of the elements in ch. I 32 (see above).

<sup>23</sup> Something already taken for granted by Joly in his CMG edition, 258, comm. ad loc.: “Il faut comprendre que l'adjectif [sc. εἰλικρινεστάτου] se rapporte aussi, pour le sens, à ὑδατος.” The opposition between typical (= pure) and atypical varieties of the elements is also virtually expressed by him in the following words: “un feu très pur est sans doute un feu très sec et une eau très pure, une eau très humide.”

varieties of the elements<sup>24</sup> – i. e. of pure fire and (pure) water, as they are called in ch. I 35 –, whose quality is irrelevant for the quantitative classification of ch. I 35. The main part of the intelligence typology<sup>25</sup> is based on the weight balance of fire and water, without regard to the specific variety of each element. That is to say, a man of the constitution 1, 2, 3 or 5 might have an intelligence profile corresponding to any of the categories 3 to 8, depending on which element prevails in his composition,<sup>26</sup> and to what extent. Conversely, a man of one of the intelligence categories 3 to 8 might have any of the constitutions 1, 2, 3 or 5, depending on which specific varieties of fire and water he is made of.

The main difficulty in this comparative interpretation of ch. I 32 and ch. I 35 is that the two typologies do not entirely overlap. There are constitutions which cannot be found in the intelligence typology, and there are intelligence categories which cannot be found among the constitutions. In other words, there are constitutional combinations of fire and water which the intelligence typology omits, and there are intelligence combinations of fire

<sup>24</sup> C. Enache, The typology 52, Figure 5.

<sup>25</sup> To be more precise: categories 3 to 8 of the intelligence typology.

<sup>26</sup> This assertion is only true if body and soul have the same composition (see above). H. Bartoš, *Soul, seed ...* 19 also holds the view that body and soul have the same composition and speaks about a “psycho-somatic unity” having “a single mixture of fire and water”. However, he didn’t feel the need to account for this view, unless one reads the following passage as an argument: “although the qualities of fire and water discussed in both chapters [sc. I 32 and I 35] may seem to coincide (e. g., in both chapters the author speaks about “the moistest fire” and “the driest water”), they are never mentioned in the same combination and therefore it is not necessary to suppose that the author is thinking of two separate kinds of mixture but only one which has different consequences for intelligence and different for health” (25). But if (1) the typologies in ch. I 32 and I 35 both operate with possible mixtures of the “psycho-somatic unity” (as I also assume) and (2) the typologies have no single combination in common (which I don’t believe), then we are forced to conclude that the author of *De victu* postulates a total of 6 + 8 possible combinations of fire and water, of which some are described in respect to their health and others in respect to their intelligence. To me it seems very improbable that the Hippocratic author deliberately picked up (at random?) only 6 of 14 constitutions in ch. I 32 and only 8 of 14 intelligence categories in ch. I 35 – without justifying his selection and without alluding to the lists’ being incomplete. At any rate, his diction suggests anything but such a modest goal: *περὶ μὲν οὖν φύσιος διαγνώσιος οὕτω χρὴ διαγινώσκειν τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς συστάσιος* “this is how it should be judged about (the knowledge of) the constitution and the original composition [of men]” (ch. I 32, CMG 150, 9–10), *περὶ δὲ φρονήσιος ψυχῆς ὀνομαζομένης καὶ ἀφροσύνης ὃδε ἔχει* “this is the truth about the so-called intelligence and stupidity of the soul” (ch. I 35, CMG 150, 29). These are definitely not the words of someone who does things by halves!

and water which the typology of human constitutions omits. We don't know anything about the intelligence of constitution 4 and 6, because the intelligence typology says nothing about the combination of a typical variety of fire or water with an atypical variety (of the other element). Also, we don't know anything about the health profile of the first two intelligence categories, because the typology of human constitutions doesn't even mention the possibility of a combination between the two atypical varieties wet fire and dry water.

As a matter of principle, I only see two ways of dealing with this dilemma. Either we accept that the typologies in ch. I 32 and ch. I 35 are both incomplete (since each of them contains items which cannot be found in the other); or we presume that they are using different classification criteria (e. g. the typology of constitutions refers to the body's composition, while the intelligence typology refers to the soul's composition), therefore, being independent, are not supposed to overlap.<sup>27</sup>

I tend to regard the first possibility as the most probable, due to the close interdependence of body and soul in the explanations of the intelligence typology. I also believe that the author used the same components in both typologies, classifying body and health in ch. I 32 and body, soul and intelligence in ch. I 35. Moreover, it is not a matter of interpretation, but a matter of fact that the typology of ch. I 32 is incomplete in the light of ch. I 35, since in ch. I 35 the author explicitly mentions a *somatic* combination of wet fire and dry water – something he doesn't consider when discussing the

<sup>27</sup> See, for instance, F. Hüffmeier, *Phronesis ... 77/78*: “[the author of De victu] stellt keinen Zusammenhang zwischen der körperlichen und der seelischen Typenreihe her und macht darüber hinaus eine Verbindung, wie mir scheint, unmöglich, indem er hier und dort mit verschiedenen Kategorien arbeitet: bei den Typen körperlicher Konstitutionen (Kap. 32) fragt er nach der verschiedenen Dichte jedes der beiden Elemente, bei den seelischen Typen (Kap. 35) nach ihrem verschiedenen Grad an Autarkeia. Diese Kategorien erscheinen an ihrer Stelle durchaus als angemessen. Aber aus ihnen ergibt sich, daß die Parallelität bestimmter körperlicher und geistiger Typen, die durch die Elemententheorie gefordert wird, unter den Begriffen der Gesundheit und der Phronesis nicht durchführbar ist.” The author takes it for granted that soul and body always have the same composition of fire and water. The impossibility of comparing ch. I 32 and ch. I 35 is due, in his opinion, to the different criteria used in the two classifications: it is because the former deals with bodies, while the latter deals with souls. However, his line of argument (1) ignores the fact that the two typologies do have something in common, viz. the atypical varieties wet fire and dry water as components, and (2) extends erroneously to all categories the self-sufficiency of the atypical varieties in the first two categories (ἐκάτερον δὲ οὕτως ἀνταρκέστατον, ch. I 35, CMG 152, 1), making it the real criterion of the whole typology (“der verschiedene Grad an Autarkeia”).

somatic constitutions in ch. I 32. My conclusion is therefore that the author of *De victu*, who obviously set a high value on a classificatory approach to philosophy and medicine, was willing to sacrifice one detail or another in order to preserve the coherence of a particular system.

Cătălin Enache  
Wiedner Gymnasium  
Wiedner Gürtel 68  
1040 Wien  
cenache@wiednergymnasium.at